History of England 1-6

Heath went further: the nine countries of the EEC should henceforth act as one in their dealings with the United States. The irony, of course, was that his relentless cold-shouldering of the United States compromised the very advantage that Britain was supposed to be bringing to the EEC. But Heath supported Nixon over Vietnam, and it is one of the more curious ironies of the age that Wilson was accused of sycophancy in his dealings with America, while Heath, who actively supported her when times were propitious, was accused of obduracy. In any case, it was clear to all by now that Heath’s priority was to gain Britain entry into the Common Market. His love of the EEC did not lie in the tradition of pragmatism characteristic of most British Europhiles, and it owed little even to the earnest talk of ‘supranationalism’ characteristic of Thirties and Forties intellectuals. His Europhilia was patriotic in origin – he believed that Britain must shrink to become great again.

Heath had been the chief negotiator during the failed application of 1963. For all his vigour, intelligence, attention to detail and Europhilia, the French had vetoed Britain. But Heath would never give up, and the experience gave him the clue to a solution; he saw that it was France, not the smaller nations, which must be wooed. He turned what powers of charm he possessed to the seduction of Georges Pompidou, the new president. One difficulty presented itself even before negotiations began. This was the Common Agricultural Policy, clearly designed to advance French agriculture. If Heath recognized that France was the chief beneficiary of European largesse, with Germany as the patient provider, he determined to overlook the fact. A greater difficulty was the demand that sterling, as the world’s paramount currency, be removed as a precondition for European monetary union.

The public was to prove itself ambivalent, as was the opposition, with opinion polls suggesting resistance to entry was as high as 70 per cent. As for the opposition, it was deeply divided. On the one hand, Labour under Wilson had also attempted to join the Common Market. On the other, ordinary members and MPs were for the most part highly suspicious, on both socialist and patriotic grounds. The EEC was capitalism incarnate, and a threat to Britain’s sovereignty. It did not help that even with the urbane and benevolent Pompidou at the French helm, negotiations remained halting and ponderous. Once again, Heath determined to deal with matters himself. In conversation with Willy Brandt, Heath pressed the British case with almost messianic urgency: ‘The world will not stand still. If Europe fails to seize this opportunity, our friends will be dismayed and our enemies heartened. Soviet ambitions of domination would be pursued more ruthlessly. Our friends, disillusioned by our disunity, would more and more be tempted to leave Europe to its own devices.’

For the climactic meeting with Pompidou, Heath prepared himself by drinking tea in the park, and receiving the opinions of experts. It was all suitably English. Pompidou himself put the European case, politely but clearly, when interviewed by the BBC. ‘The crux of the matter,’ he said, ‘is that there is a European conception or idea, and the question to be ascertained is whether the United Kingdom’s conception is indeed European. That will be the aim of my meeting with Mr Heath.’ However, the European idea represented, in practice, a French one. Perhaps recognizing this, Pompidou went on to disavow federalism, and thus was the issue of the ‘European conception’ left to slumber. Its reawakening in later years was a reversal that Heath would not live to see.

The meeting was almost uncannily successful. The two men liked each other, and, more significantly, understood one another. It took a mere two days to reach agreement. Nothing was yet official, but nothing needed to be. When Heath spoke before the Commons, a still, small voice raised an objection on the minor matter of sovereignty. Would the prime minister please clarify the nation’s status as a member of the EEC? Heath’s reply was brusque and dismissive. ‘Joining the Community does not entail a loss of national identity or an erosion of essential national sovereignty.’ The first stage had been passed, with the Commons advised merely to ‘take note’ of the terms.