Knowledge And Decisions

The point here is not simply that laws, policies, and programs can have counterproductive results. The point is that, when social processes are described in terms of their hoped-for results, this obscures the more fundamental question as to just what they actually do — and circumvents questions as to whether doing such things is likely to lead to the results expected or proclaimed. More specifically, we need to know what incentives and constraints are created by these social processes. Therefore socialism, for example, is defined in this book not in terms of such goals as equality, security, economic planning, or “social justice,” but as a system in which property rights in agriculture, commerce, and industry may be assigned and re-assigned only by political authorities, rather than through transactions in the marketplace.

To the socialist, of course, government ownership of the means of production is but a means to the various social ends being sought, but such results that are hoped for tell us nothing about the institutional processes set in motion or the incentives inherent in those processes, much less their actual consequences. Indeed, lofty goals have long distracted attention from actual consequences, most notably in many Western intellectuals' determined resistance to acknowledging the devastating consequences of communism in the Soviet Union, which the Communists themselves eventually acknowledged during the era of glasnost

under Gorbachev. The lofty goals of communism — always receding before them like the horizon — kept many Soviet sympathizers in the West mesmerized for decades, while more millions were slaughtered under Stalin than in Hitler’s death camps.

Insurgent movements in general — whether religious, political, or academic — look very different when viewed in terms of their respective goals than they do when viewed in terms of their incentives and constraints. Whether the goal of an insurgency has been to establish the Christian religion in the days of the Roman Empire, to create an Interstate Commerce Commission in nineteenth-century America or to promote civil rights for minorities in the twentieth century, what a successful insurgency does in institutional or process terms is to change the incentives and constraints facing others, as well as the incentives and constraints facing themselves and their successors. Against this background, it is not surprising that there should be certain patterns common to insurgent movements, whether those movements have been promoting religion, political ideology, minority interests, or innumerable other causes.

One of these patterns in the history of many insurgent movements has been a disappointment in the direction that the movement has taken after victory, including claims that the revolution has been “betrayed” and that the later leaders and followers have failed to live up to the high standards set by their predecessors in the insurgency. None of this is surprising when such movements are examined in terms of their processes, including the incentives and constraints at work.

First of all, the kinds of people attracted to the original insurgency, under the initial set of incentives and constraints, tend to be very different from the kinds of people who gravitate to it after it has become successful and achieved a major part of its goals. By definition, an insurgent movement forms under a set of incentives and constraints very different from those which it seeks to create. Often the members face a certain amount of hostility, or even persecution, from those around them or from an elite currently benefitting from the status quo. These original insurgents may even face dangers to their careers or to their lives. These are not conditions which tend to attract timid careerists or mere opportunists, unless the opportunists foresee a high probability that the insurgency will succeed within a period of time that is relevant to their personal ambitions.

After the success of the insurgency, however, radically different incentives and constraints are created by that very success. Many Christians in the Roman Empire, for example, went from being a poor and persecuted minority to being among the powerful agents of a state religion, able to enrich themselves and to persecute others. A similar pattern marked the history of the Communists in Russia many centuries later. On a smaller scale, the life cycle of regulatory agencies in the United States has often been seen to follow a pattern leading to control by very different kinds of people and policies from those behind the movement which led to creation of the agency in the first place.³ Cries of the betrayal of the original ideals of the American civil rights movements have also been widely heard in recent years, along with lamentations about the caliber of the later individual and organizational leadership of that movement.