Мораль и разум

Carlson S. M., Moses L. J. & Hix H. R. (1998). The role of inhibitory processes in young children’s difficulties with deception and false belief // Child Development, 69(3), 672—691.

Casati R. & Varzi A. C (1996). Events. Brookfield: Dartmouth Publishing Company.

Chalmeau R., Visalberghi E. & Galloway A. (1997). Capuchin monkeys, Cebus apella, fail to understand a cooperative task // Animal Behaviour, 54, 1215—1225.

Chandler M., Fritz A. S. & Hala S. (1989). Small scale deceit: deception as a marker of two-, three-, and four-year olds’ early theories of mind // Child Development, 60, 1263.

Chandlery M. J., Sokol В. W. & Wainryb C. (2000). Beliefs about truth and beliefs about rightness // Child Development, 71 [Г]_у 91—97.

Cheney D., Seyfartb R. & Silk J. (1995). Reconciliatory grunts by dominant female baboons influence victims’ behaviour // Animal Behaviour, 54, 409—418.

Cheney D. L. & Seyfartb R. M. (1990a). Attending to behaviour versus attending to knowledge: Examining monkeys’ attribution of mental states // Animal Behaviour, 40, 742—753.

Cheney D. L. & Seyfartb R. M. (1990b). How Monkeys See the World: Inside the mind of Another Species. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Cheney D. L., Seyfartb R. M & Silk J. (1995). The responses of female baboons (Papio cynocephalus ursinus) to anomalous social interactions: Evidence for causal reasoning? //Journal of Comparative Psychology, 109, 134—141.

Cheng P. W. & Holyoak K. W. (1985). Pragmatic reasoning schemas // Cognitive Psychology, 17, 391—416.

Cheng P W. & Holyoak K. W.

(1989). On the natural selection of reasoning theories 11 Cognition, 33, 285—313.

Chomsky N. (1957). Syntactic Structures. The Hague: Mouton.

Chomsky N. (1965). Aspects of the Theory of Syntax. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Chomsky N. (1979). Language and Responsibility. New York: Pantheon.

Chomsky N. (1986). Knowledge of language: Its nature, origin, and use. New York: Praeger.

Chomsky N. (1988). Language and Problems of Knowledge. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Chomsky N. (1995). The Minimalist Program. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Chomsky N. (2000). On Nature and Language. New York: Cambridge Univesity Press.

Clements К. C. & Stephens D. W. (1995). Testing models of non-kin cooperation: mutualism and the Prisoner’s Dilemma // Animal Behaviour, 50, 527—535.

Clements WA & Pemer J. (1994). Implicit understanding of belief // Cognitive Development, 9, 377—395.

Clutton-Brock T. H. (1991). The Evolution of Parental Care. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Clutton-Brock T. H. & Parker G. A. (1995). Punishment in animal societies // Nature, 373, 209—216.

Connor R. C. (1996). Partner preferences in by-product mutualism and the case of predator inspection in fish // Animal Behaviour, 51, 451—454.

Connor R. C, Heithaus M. R. & Barre L. M. (1999). Superalliance in bottlenose dolphins 11 Nature, 37/, 571—572.

Connor R. C, Heithaus M. R. & Barre L. M. (2000). Complex social structure, alliance stability and mating access in a bottlenose dolphin ‘super-alliance’ // Proceedings of the Royal Society, London, B, 268, 263—267.

Connor R. C., Smolker R. A. & Richards A. F.

(1992a). Dolphin alliances and coalitions // A. H. Harcourt & F. В. M. d. Waal (Eds.), Coalitions and Alliances in Humans and Other Animals (p. 415—443). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Connor R. G, Smolker R. A. & Richards A. F. (1992b). Two levels of alliance formation among male bottlenose dolphins // Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, USA, 89, 987—990.

Coppieters В. & Fotion N. (2002). Moral Constraints on War. Principles and Causes. Lan-ham: Lexington Books.

Cosmides L. & Tooby J. (1992). Cognitive adaptations for social exchange // J. Barkow & L. Cosmides & J. Tooby (Eds.), The Adapted Mind (p. 163—228). New York: Oxford University Press.

Cosmides L. & Tooby J. (2000). The cognitive neuroscience of social reasoning // M. Gazzaniga (Ed.), The New Cognitive Neurosciences (p. 1259—1270). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Csibra G. & Gergely G. (1998). The teleological origins of mentalistic action explanation: A developmental hypothesis // Developmental Science, 1, 255—259.

Csibra G., Gergely G., Biro S., Koos D. & Brockbank M. (1999). Goal attribution without agency cues: The perception of “pure reason” in infancy // Cognition, 72, 237—267.