Revelations of the Diplomatic History of the 18th Century

“Leave we him now, as to his sea affairs, commerce and manufactures, and other works both of his policy and power; and let us view him in regard to big proceedings in this last campaign, especially as to that so much talked of descent, he, in conjunction with his allies, was to make upon Schonen, and we shall find, that even therein he has acted with his usual cunning.^[65] There is no doubt but the King of Denmark was the first that proposed this descent. He found that nothing but a speedy end to a war he had so rashly and unjustly begun, could save his country from ruin and from the bold attempts of the King of Sweden, either against Norway, or against Zealand and Copenhagen. To treat separately with that prince was a thing he could not do, as foreseeing that he would

not part with an inch of ground to so unfair an enemy; and he was afraid that a Congress for a general peace, supposing the King of Sweden would consent to it upon the terms proposed by his enemies, would draw the negotiations out beyond what the situation of his affairs could bear. He invites, therefore, all his confederates to make a home thrust at the King of Sweden, by a descent into his country, where, having defeated him, as by the superiority of the forces to he employed in that design he hoped they should, they might force him to an immediate peace on such terms as they themselves pleased. I don’t know how far the rest of his confederates came into that project; but neither the Prussian nor the Hanovarian Court appeared openly in that project, and how far our English fleet, under

Sir John Norris, was to have forwarded it, I have nothing to say, but leave others to judge out of the King of Denmark’s own declaration: but the Czar came readily into it. He got thereby a new pretence to carry the war one campaign more at other people’s expense; to march his troops into the Empire again, and to have them quartered and maintained, first in Mecklenburg^[66] and then in Zealand. In the meantime he had his eyes upon Wismar, and upon a Swedish island, called Gothland. if, by surprise, he could get the first out of the hands of his confederates, he then had a good seaport, whither to transport his troops when he pleased into Germany, without asking the King of Prussia’s leave for a free passage through his territories; and if, by a sudden descent, he could dislodge

the Swedes out of the other, he then became master of the best port in the Baltic. He miscarried, however, in both these projects; for Wismar was too well guarded to be. surprised; and he found his confederates would not give him a helping hand towards conquering Gothland. After this he began to look with another eye upon the descent to he made upon Schonen. He found it equally contrary to his interest, whether it succeeded or not. For if it did, and the King was thereby forced to a general peace, he knew his interests therein would be least regarded; having already notice enough of his confederates being ready to sacrifice them, provided they got their own terms. If he did not succeed, then, besides the loss of the flower of an army he had trained and disciplined with so much care, as he very

well foresaw that the English fleet would hinder the King of Sweden from attempting anything against Denmark; so he justly feared the whole shock would fall upon him, and has he thereby forced to surrender all he had taken from Sweden. These considerations made him entirely resolved not to make one of the descent; but he did trot care to declare it till as late as possible. first, that he might the longer have his troops maintained at the Danish expense; secondly, that it might be too late for the King of Denmark to demand the necessary troops front his other confederates, and to make the descent without him; and, lastly, that by putting the Dane to a vast expense in making necessary preparations, he might still weaken him more, and, therefore, make him now the more dependent on him, and hereafter a more easy prey.