Science, Strategy and War: The Strategic Theory of John Boyd (Strategy and History)

116 Ibid., p. 134.

117 Ibid., pp. 135–6.

118 Ibid., p. 137.

119 Ibid.

120 Ibid., pp. 138–9.

121 Ibid., p. 140.

122 Ibid., p. 141.

123 Ibid., p. 142.

124 Ibid., p. 143.

125 Ibid., p. 148.

126 Ibid.

127 Ibid., p. 149.

128 Ibid., p. 150.

129 Ibid., p. 151. This strongly suggests there is more than only ‘OODA looping faster’ than the opponent.

130 Ibid.

131 Ibid., p. 152.

132 Ibid., pp. 152–3.

133 Ibid., p. 156.

134 Ibid., p. 174.

135 Ibid., p. 175.

136 Ibid., p. 176.

137 Ibid., p. 177.

138 Ibid., p. 178.

139 Ibid., p. 184.

 

6 Exploration and refinement

1 Various sources have already been mentioned in footnotes in the previous chapter. Here it is worthwhile to note the following works that appear in Boyd’s bibliography: David Downing, The Devil’s Virtuosos: German Generals at War 1940–1945 (1977); T.N. Dupuy, The Military Life of Genghis, Khan of Khans (1969) and A Genius for War (1977); J.F.C. Fuller, Grant ands Lee, (1932); Richard Gabriel and Paul Savage, Crisis in Command (1978); Richard Gabriel and Reuven Gal, ‘The IDF Officer: Linchpin in Unit Cohesion’, Army (January 1984); John Gardner, Morale (1978); Simon Goodenough and Len Deighton, Tactical Genius in Battle (1979); Heinz Guderian, Panzer Leader (1952); Richard Humble, Hitler’s Generals (1974); Albert Kesselring, Manual for Command and Combat Employment of Smaller Units (1952); Harold Lamb, Genghis Khan (1927); Kenneth Macksey, Guderian, Creator of the Blitzkrieg (1976); S.L.A. Marshall, Men Against Fire (1947); Erwin Rommel, Infantry Attacks (1937); Charles Whiting, Patton (1970); and importantly, Martin van Creveld, Command in War (1982). Boyd’s C2 concept is one among many but he does not dwell on alternatives. See for a discussion of six different command arrangements for instance Chapter 6 of David Alberts and Richard E. Heyes, Command Arrangements for Peace Operations, Washington, D.C.: US Department of Defense, CCRP publications, 1995.

2 ‘Organic design for Command and Control’, p. 2.

3 Ibid. It is not difficult to see the influence of The Tacit Dimension in this.

4 Ibid., p. 3.

5 Ibid., p. 4.

6 Ibid., pp. 7–8.

7 Ibid., p. 8.

8 Ibid., p. 9.

9 Ibid., p. 10.

10 Ibid.

11 Ibid., p. 11.

12 Ibid., p. 15.

13 Ibid., p. 16.

14 Ibid.

15 Ibid., p. 17.

16 Ibid., p. 18.

17 Ibid., p. 19.

18 Ibid., p. 20.

19 Ibid.

20 Ibid., p. 21.

21 Ibid., p. 22.

22 Ibid., p. 23.

23 Ibid., p. 24.

24 Ibid., p. 25.

25 Ibid., p. 26.

26 Ibid., p. 28.

27 Ibid., p. 30.

28 Ibid., p. 29.

29 Ibid., p. 31.

30 Ibid., p. 32.

31 Ibid., p. 35.

32 Ibid., p. 34.

33 Ibid., p. 37. The definitions of command and control are here contrasted deliberately against those of understanding, monitoring, appreciation and leadership. Boyd actually listed them together in one sequence.

34 Ibid., p. 36.

35 Strategic Game of ? and ?, p. 1.

36 The ‘approach’ Boyd takes in this presentation and described here is on p. 4.

37 Ibid., p. 3.

38 Ibid., p. 6.

39 Ibid., pp. 7–9.

40 Ibid., p. 10.

41 Ibid., p. 12.

42 Ibid., p. 14.

43 Ibid., p. 15.

44 Ibid., p. 16. Quotations are presented here as in the presentation.

45 Ibid., p. 17. Erie was Boyd’s former hometown.

46 Ibid., pp. 18–19.

47 Ibid., p. 20.

48 Ibid., p. 21.

49 Ibid., p. 22.

50 Ibid., p. 23.

51 Ibid., p. 24.

52 Ibid., p. 25.

53 Ibid., p. 28.

54 Ibid., p. 29. Italics are mine.

55 Ibid., p. 30.

56 Ibid., p. 33. Italics are mine.

57 Ibid., p. 34.

58 Ibid., p. 35.

59 Ibid., p. 36.

60 Ibid., p. 37.

61 Ibid., p. 46.

62 Ibid., p. 38.

63 Ibid., p. 39.

64 Ibid., pp. 40–3.

65 Ibid., p. 44.

66 Ibid., p. 45.

67 Ibid., p. 46.

68 Ibid., p. 47.

69 Ibid., p. 48.

70 Ibid., p. 49.

71 Ibid., p. 50.

72 Ibid., p. 51.

73 Ibid., p. 54.

74 Ibid., p. 55.

75 Ibid., p. 56.

76 Ibid., p. 57.

77 Ibid., p. 58.

78 Michael Polanyi, Knowing and Being, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, p. 70.

79 Ibid., p. 177.

80 Boyd, The Conceptual Spiral, p. 2.

81 Ibid., p. 4.

82 Ibid., p. 5.

83 Ibid., pp. 9–12.

84 Ibid., p. 14. The next section almost literally follows Boyd’s text on p. 14.

85 Ibid., p. 16.

86 Ibid., p. 17.

87 Ibid., p. 18.

88 Ibid., p. 19.

89 Ibid., p. 20.

90 Ibid., p. 21.

91 Ibid., p. 22.

92 Ibid., p. 23.

93 Ibid., p. 24.

94 Ibid., p. 25.

95 Ibid., p. 26, italics are mine.

96 Ibid., p. 27.

97 Ibid., p. 28.

98 Ibid., p. 29.

99 Ibid., p. 30.

100 Ibid., p. 31.

101 Ibid., p. 32.

102 Ibid., p. 33.

103 Ibid., p. 34.

104 Ibid., p. 35.

105 Ibid., p. 36.

106 Ibid., p. 37.

107 Ibid., p. 38.

108 Grant T. Hammond, The Mind of War, John Boyd and American Security, Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 2001, p. 188.

109 Robert Polk, ‘A Critique of the Boyd Theory – Is it Relevant to the Army?’, Defense Analysis, Vol. 16, No. 3, 2000, p. 259.

110 Grant T. Hammond, The Essence of Winning and Losing, op. cit., p. 2.

111 Ibid., p. 4.

112 Ibid., p. 5.

 

7 Completing the loop

1 Cited in Abraham Kaplan, The Conduct of Scientific Inquiry, San Francisco: Chandler Publishing, 1964, p. 303.

2 James N. Rosenau, The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy, New York: The Free Press, 2nd edition, 1980, p. 26.

3 Jay Luvaas, ‘Clausewitz: Fuller and Liddell Hart’, Journal of Strategic Studies, 9 (1986), p. 207.