Tapping Hitler's Generals

The optimists held on to their hopes for a happy outcome to the war while the realists were of the opinion that it was already decided long ago, and Germany’s only possibility was unconditional surrender. ‘We entered the New Year with awful morale’ wrote Generalmajor Paul von Felbert in his diary. ‘That Germany was totally beaten was totally clear to all of us with exception of the incorrigibles such as Ramcke and cronies’ (Felbert, diary, p. 71). The differences came clearly into the light in a long conversation between General Heinrich Eberbach and his son Oberleutnant zur See Heinz Eberbach on 20 and 21 September 1944 (Document 37). The 23-year-old U-boat commander was still convinced that ‘miracle weapons’ would turn the tide while his father considered the whole thing ‘hopeless’. He had reached the final stage of a long process of acceptance. In December 1943, the general was still believing it possible to ‘crush the Russians’, and in June 1944 he still would not admit that the war was lost. After beating off the invasion ‘we will have our heads above water,’ he hoped (Document 64).[171]

Once it had proved impossible to halt the Allied divisions, not to mention repel them, ‘there was no more point to it’, General Eberbach said in February 1945. Extracts from his letters from Normandy show this: ‘How can it go on without the V-2 or other miracle weapons?’ he asked on 11 July. Five days later he wrote: ‘Heavy fighting–spearhead not large–questions in the eyes of my soldiers–we still lack the great decision.’ And on 20 July: ‘Hold out! Hold out! 116 Panzer Div. not for another five days! No way out.’ Shortly afterwards the US 3rd Army broke through the German lines west of St Lo and near Avranches, and on 3 August 1944 broke out from the hard-fought bridgehead. The German defences were at the end of their strength, and now Hitler ordered an extravagant counter-attack which plunged the Western Army into catastrophe. On 5 August Eberbach wrote home: ‘Situation remains extremely tense. All commanders exhausted. I often think of Bismarck’s greatness.’ Finally, on the 17th: ‘No great decision. I can no longer see a way out.’[172]

Eberbach therefore had his road-to-Damascus experience at Normandy in the high summer of 1944.[173]

By 1942 Thoma had had no illusions about the situation, other–perhaps not all–Afrika Korps generals followed in 1943. Even those prisoners with knowledge of strategy were obliged to acknowledge after the failure of the Ardennes offensive and the push into Reich territory by the Allied armies in January and February 1945 that the war was lost. In the early spring nobody believed in final victory or even a negotiated peace. Nevertheless the inferences drawn varied. Should one capitulate or fight to the bitter end? Even far from the tentacles of the regime the deeply anchored concept of military honour remained firm. The comparatively critical Generalmajor Wahle observed in February 1945 that ‘the most elementary military honour’ demanded that one should keep fighting (Document 64).

[174] The German people must lose the war honourably by fighting to the last gasp, General Choltitz said in March 1945. The honourable struggle would prevent the people going under and having their spirit broken (Document 66). Ramcke, paratroop general and a convinced National Socialist, admitted it to be his heartfelt wish that the German people would have the strength to defend every bridge, every hill-ridge, every town, to the last. The victorious powers could then allow the Germans to quietly die out, but they would at least have gone down fighting (Document 38). In September 1944 Ramcke had defended the French port of Brest until out of ammunition, and his stubborn resistance must be the model for the Battle for Germany. That he had previously taken steps to ensure that he would be the only man to escape from Brest by air demonstrates the deceptiveness of such images of Götterdämmerung

. That Ramcke actually believed the Allies were intent upon the biological extermination of the German people can be assumed. This kind of propaganda was mouthed by other pro-Nazi generals such as SS-Brigadeführer Kurt Meyer and Luftwaffe-Generalleutnant Heyking (Document 51).

At Clinton Camp, USA, there was an internal court martial of Generalmajor Botho Elster for surrendering to the Americans with 20,000 men,[175] but he was able to get the charge dropped. Generalmajor Paul von Felbert was sentenced to death in his absence on 3 January 1945 for capitulating in a parallel situation in September 1944. His family was arrested. ‘Nevertheless I am shocked’, Generalleutnant Menny noted in his diary at the end of 1944,