The Future Is History: How Totalitarianism Reclaimed Russia

Tensions had been mounting ever since the 2003 Rose Revolution, when an exuberantly pro-Western government took over. In 2006, Russia banned the import of Georgian mineral water and wine—a source of substantial revenue for the tiny nation—and began restricting the supply of gas to Georgia. It also started amassing troops on the border. These and other actions were primarily directed at continuing to inflame longstanding conflicts in two of Georgia's separatist regions, South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Both were self- proclaimed independent republics with close ties to Russia. Both had existed in a state of neither war nor peace, neither independence nor integration, since the early 1990s. Weak, embattled central governments of the 1990s and early 2000s made this stalemate relatively easy to maintain. The new Georgian government, however, tried both carrot and stick to bring the republics back into the fold; Russia retaliated with redoubled support for the regions and intensified hostilities with the Georgian government. One apparent goal was to torpedo Georgia's attempts to join NATO—and in April 2008 Georgia's application was denied, with unresolved conflicts cited as at least one of the reasons. Two weeks later Putin—legally, in his last two weeks as president—signed a decree establishing economic and political relations with South Ossetia and Abkhazia that were essentially similar to Moscow's relations with the regions of Russia. Then, following a summer of assorted skirmishes, a full- fledged war broke out, with artillery fighting on the ground and Russia attacking from the air.

Ten days into the fighting, France and Germany brokered a cease­fire agreement, which Russia promptly violated. By the end of August, when the fighting stopped, Russia effectively controlled a large portion of Georgia and had issued Russian passports to local residents, turning them instantly into "countrymen."⁴⁵ On paper, Abkhazia and South Ossetia had declared independence, and Russia had recognized it, as had Nicaragua, Venezuela, and the tiny Pacific island nation of Nauru.⁴⁶

The message to Georgia—and any other post-Soviet country that might have wanted to follow its example— was, If you try to ally with NATO, you will lose lives and territory and will be assured NATO limbo in perpetuity.

A separate message was intended for the West and for Russian citizens: South Ossetia and Abkhazia were just like Kosovo, which had seceded from Serbia because it had a closer affinity with neighboring Albania. NATO had intervened on behalf of Kosovo, giving Russia the moral right to intervene on behalf of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. In 2008, Kosovo, which had been a de facto protectorate since 1999, was about to declare independence—and it was clear that the requisite majority of United Nations member countries would presently recognize it as a state. Russia perceived Kosovo's ascendance as an affront, just as it had perceived the 1999 NATO intervention as an insult—and now it was in a position to retaliate. Just days before Kosovo's announcement, Russian officials summoned South Ossetian and Abkhazian leaders to Moscow for talks and the Russian foreign minister issued a statement that said, "The declaration and recognition of Kosovar independence will make Russia adjust its line toward Abkhazia and South Ossetia."⁴⁷

It was right after the invasion of Georgia that Dugin launched his Center for Conservative Studies. He gushed about the war in his opening address: "We have conducted an intervention, and now we are saying that we didn't just conduct it as an exceptional case but we will continue to commit acts of intervention whenever we deem appropriate."⁴⁸ Causes for an intervention would include the perceived need to protect "countrymen abroad," the eternal need to resist a unipolar world, and the necessity of asserting Russia's interests in what it considered its sphere of influence.

If the president says that Russia's friendly regions represent a zone of privileged interest, that means that this zone is under Russian control. And anyone who tries to challenge that is challenging not only that specific country but Russia, with all its nuclear arms.

Dugin claimed to be interpreting and forecasting Russia's foreign policy, and his claim was now credible. That summer, he had gone to

South Ossetia and posed in front of a tank with a Kalashnikov in his hands. That summer had also marked the first time he had seen one of his slogans catch on and go entirely mainstream, repeated on television and reproduced on bumper stickers. The slogan was, "Tanks to Tbilisi!"* Dugin had written, "Those who do not support the

slogan 'Tanks to Tbilisi!' are not Russians 'Tanks to Tbilisi!'

should be written on every Russian's forehead."⁴⁹

The slogans, and the war, worked: according to Levada Center polls, Putin's popularity rating shot up to 88 percent, its highest point ever. Medvedev's hit 83 percent, also unprecedented.⁵⁰

PART FIVE

PROTEST