In the following months, the implications grew. At the Ukrainian Congress in May, Kossior attacked Postyshev. In Kiev more than anywhere, he said, Trotskyites had been able to gain important posts.227
Other speakers upbraided those in Kiev “who had let in enemies.” Over several years of complacency, the main thing had been a personality cult involving “Greetings to Postyshev!” as the restored and rehabilitated Nikolayenko smugly remarked to the uneasy delegates.228 He had been, in fact, “intoxicated with success” because of “the noise our press made round his name.”229The defeat and demotion of Postyshev was only the beginning. Over the next few years, the great majority (70 percent) of the Central Committee which had just seen his final and fumbling stand was to follow Bukharin and Rykov to the death cells.
For, politically, Stalin’s battle had now been won. The way was at last completely open to the total annihilation of the old oppositionists. At the same time, by his actions against Postyshev, he had made the first moves to undermining and destroying that group of his own followers who had hoped to block him.
But the main change was that the last attempt to preserve some sort of constitutional procedure had been defeated. In future, he was not to observe any such limitations. In six months, the position had changed radically. In the autumn of 1936, Stalin had had to argue and exert pressure to secure the arrest and trial even of potential rivals. Now, he could order the arrest of his closest colleagues without consulting anyone. He could strike when and where he liked, without appeal. The point at which his despotism became an absolute autocracy may be dated as the February–March plenum.
There were still steps to be taken to ensure the irrevocability of the victory. The demoralized and defeated rank and file of the Central Committee, convicted of the most capital of all crimes, ineffective disloyalty, had to be mopped up. The Purge had so far only affected a limited section of the Soviet people, among whom there remained much political indiscipline to be eradicated. And the Army remained—to all appearances wholly obedient, but tyrants have often been misled on this point, and Stalin was soon to insure himself against such a mistake.
But first, the instrument of terror needed retuning. The old NKVD of Yagoda’s time was technically efficient, but in certain respects it lacked the true Stalinist spirit. In any case, its new master could not trust his predecessor’s men.
In March, Yezhov ordered the departmental chiefs of the NKVD to proceed to various parts of the country on a massive inspection. Only Slutsky of the Foreign Department and—for the moment—Pauker were not so assigned. The others, leaving shortly afterward, were arrested at the first stations out of Moscow in their various directions, and brought back to prison. Two days later, the same trick was played on the deputy heads of the departments. At the same time, Yezhov changed the NKVD in all sensitive spots.230
He had already barricaded himself in a separate wing of the NKVD building, surrounded by a formidable bodyguard and elaborate security precautions.231On 18 March 1937232
Yezhov addressed a meeting of senior officers of the NKVD in the Secret Police club room at the Lubyanka. He denounced Yagoda as a former Tsarist police spy and a thief and an embezzler, and went on to speak of “Yagoda’s spies” in the NKVD. He proceeded to clean up the remaining Yagoda cadres. They were arrested in their offices by day or in their homes by night. Chertok, the bullying interrogator of Kamenev, threw himself from his twelfth-floor apartment. Other officers shot themselves, or committed suicide by jumping from their office windows.233 Most went passively, Bulanov, arrested at the end of March, among them.234 Three thousand of Yagoda’s NKVD officers are reported executed in 1937,235 while over the whole period about 20,000 NKVD men “fell victim.”236 Of his departmental chiefs, Molchanov, Mironov, and Shanin were to be denounced as Rightist conspirators,237 organized as such in the OGPU in 1931 and 1932, while Pauker (who disappeared in the summer) and Gay were transmuted to spies,238 together with Pauker’s deputy Volovich. (Pauker, a Jew, was spoken of as specifically a German spy.)239On 3 April it was announced that Yagoda himself had been arrested for “offenses of a criminal nature in connection with his official duties.”240
Next day, an announcement was made of a new People’s Commissar and Assistant People’s Commissar of Communications.241 The transfer of the former Assistant People’s Commissar G. E. Prokofiev was also published. Although he was still named as “Comrade,” he was arrested shortly afterward as a Rightist and later attempted suicide in prison.242 The wives of both men were also arrested and were sent to a camp.243 Yagoda’s dacha was taken over by Molotov.244