1
One of Tolstoy’s Russian critics, M. M. Rubinshtein, referred to above (9/1), 80 ff., says that every science employs2
[‘The obscure through the more obscure’, i.e. explaining something obscure in terms of something even more obscure.]1
2
See V. B. Shklovsky, op. cit. (7/3), chapters 7 and 8, and also K. Pokrovsky, ‘Istochniki romana “Voina i mir” ’, in Obninsky and Polner, op. cit. (9/1), 113–28.1
2
‘Neskol′ko slov po povodu knigi: “Voina i mir”’ (1868), T xvi 5–16.1
1
op. cit. (8/2), 34, 40.2
N. I. Kareev, ‘Istoricheskaya filosofiya v “Voine i mire”’,3
ibid. 230; cf.1
B. M. Eikhenbaum,2
Here the paradox appears once more; for the ‘infinitesimals’, whose integration is the task of the ideal historian, must be reasonably uniform to make this operation possible; yet the sense of ‘reality’ consists in the sense of their unique differences.1
In our day French existentialists, for similar psychological reasons, have struck out against all explanations as such because they are a mere drug to still serious questions, short-lived palliatives for wounds which are unbearable but must be borne, above all not denied or ‘explained’; for all explaining is explaining away, and that is a denial of the given – the existent – the brute facts.1
For example, both Shklovsky (1
‘On n’a pas rendu justice à Rousseau […]. J’ai lu tout Rousseau, oui, tous les vingt volumes, y compris le1
ibid. (‘il n’y a point de panache à la guerre’).1
See Adolfo Omodeo,2
‘Chitayu Maistr′a’, T xlviii 66.1
See Eikhenbaum, op. cit. (40/ 1), i 308–17.2
3
ibid. vol. 1, part 1, chapter 3, T x 13–16; W 10–13. For the note see T xiii 687.1
ibid. vol. 4, part 3, chapter 19, T xii 167; W 1182.2
S. P. Zhikharev,