The Historians' History of the World 05

It may be assumed that the whole people was convened according to its division into thirty-five tribes; that in each tribe account was taken of the five classes, arranged according to an ascending scale of property, which, however, had been greatly altered from that attributed to Servius; and that in each tribe each of the five classes was subdivided into two centuries, one of seniores, or men between forty-five and sixty, one of juniores, or men between eighteen and forty-five. On the whole, then, with the addition of eighteen centuries of knights, there would be 368 centuries. This plan, though it allowed far less influence to wealth than the plan of Servius, would yet leave a considerable advantage to the richer classes. For it is plain that the two centuries of the first class in each tribe would contain far fewer members than the two centuries of the second class, those of the second fewer than those of the third, and all those of the first four together, probably, fewer than those of the fifth. Yet these four classes, having in all 280 or (with the knights) 298 centuries, would command an absolute majority; for the question was still decided by the majority of centuries.

THE ASSEMBLY OF THE TRIBES

While the centuriate assembly was becoming more popular in its constitution, a still more democratic body had come into existence.[68]

There can be no doubt that when the centuriate assembly was restored by the patricians after the expulsion of Tarquinius,[69] it was intended to be the sole legislative body. The more recent legislative assembly of the tribes was a spontaneous growth of popular will, not contemplated by statesmen. The tribe assembly, originally intended to conduct the business of the plebeian order, gradually extended its power over the whole body politic; and its ordinances (plebiscita) became laws.

The tribunes were originally invested with political authority for the purpose of protecting the persons of the plebeians from the arbitrary punishments inflicted by the patrician magistrates. It was no doubt intended that this authority should be only suspensive, so as to prevent sudden acts of violence. But the tribunes soon assumed the license of standing between plebeians and the law. Thus they established the celebrated right of intercession, which in course of time they extended to all matters. They forbade trials, stopped elections, put a veto on the passing of laws. So far, however, their power was only negative. But when the tribe assembly obtained legislative rights, the tribunes obtained a positive authority. The power of the tribunes and of the tribes implied each other. The plebeian assembly was dead without able and resolute tribunes; the tribunes were impotent without the democracy.

Roman Statesman

This relation was at once established when the election of the tribunes was committed to the tribes themselves. The tribunes soon began to summon the tribes to discuss political questions; and the formidable authority which they now wielded appeared in the overthrow of the decemvirate and the recognition of the tribe assembly as a legislative body. The political powers then gained by the Valerio-Horatian laws were confirmed and extended by the popular dictators, Q. Publilius Philo and Q. Hortensius.

Thus the Roman constitution presents us with the apparent anomaly of two distinct legislative assemblies, each independent of the other. Nor were any distinct provinces of action assigned to each. This being so, we should expect to find the one clashing with the other; to hear of popular laws emanating from the one body met with a counter-project from the other. But no such struggles are recorded. The only way in which it can be known that a particular law is due to the more popular or to the more aristocratic assembly is by looking to the name of the mover, by which every law was designated. If the name be that of a tribune, the law must be referred to the tribe assembly. If the name be that of a consul, prætor, or dictator, the law must be referred to the centuriate assembly.[70] What, then, were the causes which prevented collisions which appear inevitable?

First, it must be remembered that, though the centuriate assembly had been made more democratic, yet the tribe assembly was very far indeed from a purely democratic body. In the latter, the suffrages were taken by the head in each of the thirty-five tribes, and if eighteen tribes voted one way, and seventeen another, the question was decided by the votes of the eighteen. But the eighteen rarely, if ever, contained an absolute majority of citizens. For the whole population of Rome, with all the freedmen, were thrown into four tribes only, and if these four tribes were in the minority, there can be no doubt that the minority of tribes represented a majority of voters. Thus, even in the more popular assembly, there was not wanting a counterpoise to the will of the mere majority.