The Historians' History of the World 05

It is doubtful whether this measure of reform was followed by the good effects intended by Gracchus. If the governors of provinces were senators, the farmers of the taxes were equites. The new juries had their personal reasons for acquitting corrupt magistrates; for without the countenance of these magistrates they could not demand money from the provincials beyond what was strictly legal. The constitution of these juries formed a chief ground of political contest for the next fifty years.

(2) Another measure which fettered the power and patronage of the senate was the Sempronian law for the assignment of the consular provinces. Hitherto the senate had refrained from determining these provinces till after the elections, and they thus had a ready way of marking displeasure by allotting unprofitable governments to consuls whom they disliked. But Gracchus now ordained that the two consular provinces should be fixed before the elections, and that the new consuls, immediately upon their election, should settle between themselves what provinces each was to administer, either by lot or by agreement (sortitio

or comparatio). It was a wise and equitable provision, which remained in force as long as the republic lasted.

(3) A great blow was given to senatorial power by a measure for improving the roads of Italy. Public works of all kinds had hitherto been left to the censors, subject to the approval of the senate. Gracchus now transferred the business to the tribunes.

This account of the chief Sempronian laws shows the spirit which animated Gracchus. It is plain that his main purpose was to diminish the increased and increasing power of the senate. It was no doubt a confusion between the purposes and the results of the Sempronian legislation that swelled the cry against Gracchus in after-times. It is clear, however, that he had no chance of amending the corrupt government of the senatorial oligarchy, unless he first weakened their power; and if he fancied that administrative functions might safely be controlled by a large and fluctuating popular assembly, something may be forgiven to political inexperience. Representative bodies are a modern invention, and the wisest of the ancients found no halting-place between aristocracy and democracy. Gracchus was not without misgivings as to the effects of his legislation. But it was too late to draw back, and his zeal was quickened by the return of Fulvius Flaccus from Gaul. By his measures Gracchus had so won all suffrages, that he and his friend Flaccus were absolute masters of the comitia. Gracchus told the people he had a favour to ask; he proposed as candidate for the consulship C. Fannius, an old comrade of his brother. Fannius was elected as a matter of course, to the rejection of L. Opimius, the senatorial candidate.

[123-121 B.C.]

The tribunician elections followed. Flaccus, though he had been consul, appeared as candidate for an office that had been raised by the Gracchi to sovereign power. But Gracchus was not by his side; for it had been made illegal that the same man should be re-elected tribune. However, there were not candidates enough for the ten places; and the people, exercising the absolute right of choice which in this contingency was allowed, re-elected Gracchus by a unanimous vote.[80] Not more than seven months of his first year’s tribunate were over, and he was secure of power for the next seventeen months at least. He now put forth all the tremendous power of the office. The senate sat powerless, and Caius Gracchus became for a time the virtual sovereign of the empire.

Immediately on re-election, Gracchus came forward with a bill for extending the Roman franchise, certainly to the citizens of all Latin colonies, probably to all free Italian communities. Here we recognise the hand of Flaccus, who had in his consulship raised this momentous question, and resumed the project on the first opportunity after his return.

A Tribune of the People