In other words, in the Far East, the collision between
For nineteenth-century Russian Slavophiles, monarchy was the natural, traditional form of political organization; on the other hand, "freedom of life and of the spirit" (or what I would call latent limitations on power) was also sanctified by tradition. The problem of the ideal political structure consequently consisted not in destroying the original harmony of both traditions in order to achieve constitutional limitations on power, but, on the contrary, in preserving their mutual trust and harmony. How was this to be done? Just as it was done in a family or in a peasant commune. Did children or peasants seek constitutional limitations on the power of the father or head man? Could a constitution be a real guarantee against the abuse of power, whether in a family, in a commune, or in a nation? Who would guarantee this guarantee?
"Look at the West," exclaimed Aksakov, "the peoples . . . have begun to believe in the possibility of a perfect government and have made up republics and devised constitutions . . . and have become poor in spirit. . . . [The societies] are ready to collapse ... at any moment."40
In a fatal fit of mindlessness, the European peoples had destroyed what Confucius calledTeoriia gosudarstva и stavianofitov, p. 31
.Ibid.,
p. 38.querer. The Russian monarch took on the status of a despot, and the free subject people, the status of a captive slave."42
As Aksakov explains it: "The state accomplished a coup d'etat, dissolved the alliance with the land and subordinated it to itself."43How was Russia to be purified of pollution and return to the national tradition? The reader will probably not be surprised now to learn that the political recommendations of the Slavophiles coincided word for word with the "political dream" of Prince Kurbskii and the author of
Despite their new philosophical ammunition, Aksakov's Slavophiles proved weaker than their medieval ancestors. The "myth of the state" was an apologia for despotism, which they should have rebelled against and revised. But like their twentieth-century descen- dents, the new Russian right (Solzhenitsyn being a best example), they counterposed to the "myth of the state" not analysis but a myth of their own, which I would call the "myth of the land." And just as the modern Slavophiles appeal from the alien Marxist state to the prerevolutionary "enlightened authoritarianism" of the tsars, their predecessors appealed from the alien police state of the tsars to the "enlightened authoritarianism" of pre-Petrine Russia. And again, like the modern Slavophiles, who associate the origin of autocracy, i.e., serfdom and despotism, with Lenin, their predecessors, contrary to facts generally known, connected the origins of serfdom and despotism not with the time of Ivan the Terrible but with that of Peter. How indeed could Russians have enslaved their compatriots when the "land" was still firmly closed to the penetration of Western influences? As far as the myth was concerned, serfdom and despotism simply could not exist in Russia before Peter.