The Origins of Autocracy

Two conditions led to the swift liquidation of the Muscovite latifundia of that time. In the first place, their owners rarely possessed the ability and the desire to organize their operation in a new way. ... In the sec­ond place, the status of a feudal noble carried "obligations" with it, at that time as later: a great boyar . . . had by tradition to keep an exten­sive "household," a mass of idle attendants and retainers. ... As long as all these lived on grain gotten free from the peasants, the boyar might not notice the economic burden of his official prestige. But when many things had to be bought for money—money whose value was fall­ing from year to year as the Muscovite economy developed—it became a heavy burden on the shoulders of the large landowners. . . . The small vassals were in this case in a considerably more advantageous position. They did not spend money on their service, and in fact re­ceived money for it. . . . If we add to this that the small estate was con­siderably easier to organize than the large ones . . . and that the small landowner was better able to supervise personally the work of his cor- vie

peasants and slaves, while the large landowner had to do this through an overseer, we see that when the battle between the large and middle-sized landholdings began, all the economic benefits were on the side of the latter ... by expropriating the rich

votchina

boyar, the Oprichnina followed the path of natural economic development."

Here we have both proofs at once—of the reactionary nature of boyar votchina and the progressive nature of service landholding.

True, the "economic" character of both provokes some doubt, to say the least. For, having to do chiefly with "the burden of official pres­tige" and "a lack of desire to organize the economy in a new way," we still remain primarily in the sphere of social psychology. The only properly economic consideration here seems to be the fall in the value of money, and the consequent rise in the price of grain. How­ever, this "price revolution" was by no means specifically Russian, but was a phenomenon common to all of Europe. Even in Pokrovskii's time this was known to every student. But if this is so, why is it that the progressive "agrarian revolution" in favor of the small vassals, which was connected with this in Pokrovskii's opinion, was successful only in Russia and in Eastern Europe, and did not become widespread any­where in the West? Were the Western seigneurs more willing than the Muscovite boyars to "organize their economy in a new way" ? Or per­haps their "feudal noble status" carried fewer obligations and it was, therefore, easier for them to bear the "economic burden of their offi­cial prestige" ? Unfortunately there is no answer to these questions to be found in the economic apologia for the Oprichnina. And there are also others.