The Russian Revolution

The Trubetskoi-Kryzhanovskii-Lopukhin reform proposal which Mirskii presented to Nicholas early in December 1904 was a cleverly worded appeal to the Tsar’s conservative instincts.⁴¹ The authors made the proposed constitutional and parliamentary concessions appear to be a restoration of old practices rather than the revolutionary innovation that they really were. The reforms of Alexander II, they wrote, had ended the “patrimonial” (votchinnyi) regime in Russia by introducing the notion of public interest. They

marked the end of the old patrimonial order and, along with it, of the personalized notions of rulership. Russia ceased to be the personal property and fiefdom of its ruler.… [The concepts] of “public interest” and “public opinion” suggested the emergence of the impersonal state … with its own body politic, separate from the person of the ruler.⁴²

Legality (zakonnosf) was depicted as entirely compatible with autocracy because the Tsar would remain the exclusive source of laws, which he could repeal at will. The proposed representative body—envisaged as limited to consultative function—was depicted as a return to the days of “true autocracy” when tsars used to heed the voice of their people.

Mirskii’s draft was discussed on December 7 by high officials under Nicholas’s chairmanship. The most controversial clause called for the introduction into the State Council, at the time an exclusively appointed body, of deputies elected by the zemstva. It was an exceedingly modest measure, but it did inject the elective principle into a political system in which legislation and administration were the exclusive preserve of the monarch and officials designated by him. In advocating its adoption, Mirskii argued that it would “ensure domestic tranquility better than the most determined police measures.”⁴³

According to Witte, the meeting was very emotional. The majority of the ministers sided with Mirskii. The chief adversary was Konstantin Pobedonostsev, the procurator of the Holy Synod and the regime’s most influential conservative, who saw in the introduction of elected representatives into state institutions a fatal breach in Russia’s traditional political system. Having heard out both sides, Nicholas agreed to all of Mirskii’s proposals. Those present left the meeting with the sense of having been witnesses to a momentous event in Russia’s history.⁴⁴

At the Tsar’s request, Witte prepared an appropriate document for his signature. But Nicholas had second thoughts: he needed reassurance. Before signing it into law, he consulted Grand Duke Sergei and Witte. Both advised against adding elected representatives to the State Council—Sergei out of conviction, Witte more likely out of opportunism. Nicholas did not require much convincing: relieved, he struck out this provision. “I shall never, under any circumstances,” he told Witte, “agree to a representative form of government because I consider it harmful to the people whom God has entrusted to my care.”⁴⁵

When he learned of the Tsar’s change of heart on the key provision in his draft, Mirskii fell into despondency. Convinced that all was lost he offered to resign, but Nicholas persuaded him to stay on.

On December 12, 1904, the government made public a law “Concerning the Improvement of the Political Order,” which, its title notwithstanding, announced all kinds of reforms except in the realm of politics.⁴⁶ One set of measures addressed the condition of the peasantry, “so dear to OUR heart.” Others dealt with the population’s legal and civil rights. Government officials would be held accountable for misdemeanors. The sphere of activity of zemstva would be broadened and zemstvo

institutions introduced into lower administrative units. There were pledges of state insurance for workers, equal justice for all, religious tolerance, and the easing of censorship. The emergency regulations of 1881 providing for the suspension of civil rights in areas placed under Safeguard would be modified.

All this was welcome. But the absence of any political concessions was widely seen as a rejection of the demands of the November 1904 Zemstvo Congress.⁴⁷ For this reason the Law of December 12 was given little chance to resolve the national crisis, which was first and foremost political in nature.

Commissions were named to draft laws implementing the December 12 edict, but they had no issue because neither Nicholas nor the Court desired changes, preferring to procrastinate. They may have been hoping for some miracle, perhaps a decisive victory over the Japanese now that the Minister of War, Kuropatkin, had taken personal command of the Russian armies in the Far East. On October 2, Russia’s Baltic Fleet sailed to relieve Port Arthur.

But no miracle occurred. Instead, on December 20, 1904/January 2, 1905, Port Arthur surrendered. The Japanese captured 25,000 prisoners and what was left of Russia’s Pacific Fleet.