The Russian Revolution

Witte agreed to assume the chairmanship of the Council of Ministers only on condition that he be permitted to act as a genuine Prime Minister and select his cabinet. Like Ermolov, Kryzhanovskii, and other experienced officials, he felt that a cohesive, disciplined ministry was an absolute necessity in view of the government’s imminent confrontation with an elected legislature.¹²⁸ Although there was no reason why such a ministry could not consist exclusively of bureaucrats, Witte believed that the cabinet would be much more effective if it included some respected public figures.

On November 19, he initiated talks with Dmitrii Shipov, Alexander Guchkov, a prominent industrialist, Prince E. N. Trubetskoi, a professor of philosophy and the brother of the recently deceased rector of Moscow University, and several other public figures.¹²⁹

The persons he approached with offers of posts in the government were liberal-conservatives, on good terms alike with the opposition and the bureaucracy. The mere fact of a minister choosing a cabinet was without precedent (and, one may add, without sequel): “For the first time in tsarist history someone beside the tsar had single-handedly dictated the identity of most of the ministers.”¹³⁰

The negotiations collapsed within a week. Those whom Witte had approached turned down his offer on the ostensible ground that they could not work together with Peter Durnovo, whom Witte had offered the Ministry of the Interior. Durnovo had once been implicated in a sordid affair involving his mistress and the Spanish Ambassador. He was further mistrusted because of his long-standing connection with the police. But the country was in chaos, virtually in a condition of civil war, and it required an experienced administrator to restore order. Durnovo happened to have the experience and the practical intelligence needed for the job. Witte refused to yield to Durnovo’s critics, for he realized that the fate of the reforms hinged on his ability to pacify the country as quickly as possible. But judging by the fate of subsequent attempts to bring public figures into the government, all of which would also fail, it is questionable that Durnovo was anything more than a pretext. The leaders even of the moderate, liberal-conservative opposition feared being accused of betrayal by the liberals and the socialists, for whom the October Manifesto was only a stepping-stone toward a Russian Republic. By entering the government they risked isolating themselves from society without gaining effective influence on policy, for they had no guarantee that the bureaucracy would not use them for its own purposes. But concern over physical safety also played its part: “I would not be candid,” Witte wrote in retrospect,

10. Crowds celebrating the proclamation of the Manifesto of October 17, 1905.

if I did not voice the impression, perhaps an entirely groundless one, that at the time public figures were frightened of the bombs and the Brownings which were in common use against those in power, and that this was one of the inner motives which whispered to each, in the depths of his soul: “As far as possible from danger.”¹³¹

Witte behaved like a Western Prime Minister not only in selecting his cabinet but in requiring the governors and the military authorities, who in Russia carried administrative responsibilities, to submit daily reports to him. He also established a press bureau to promote favorable news coverage for himself.¹³²

These practices were not appreciated at the Court, which suspected him of using the crisis to accumulate personal power and make himself into a “Grand Vizier.” How insecure Witte’s position was may be judged from the fact that in a letter to his mother Nicholas referred to his Prime Minister, who had to deal with Jewish bankers abroad to secure loans for Russia, as a “chameleon” trusted only by “foreign Yids.”¹³³

The October Manifesto, and the political amnesty act that followed, succeeded in good measure in calming strikes and other forms of radical unrest in the cities. At the same time it unleashed even more violent disorders by right-wing elements against those whom they held responsible for forcing the Tsar to concede something as un-Russian as a constitution, as well as by peasants against landed proprietors. It would be futile to seek any logic in these excesses which would rage for the next two years. They were outbursts of pent-up resentments set off by the breakdown of authority: irrational and even anti-rational, without a program, they represented the Russian bunt which Witte feared and hoped to prevent.