The Threat

The representative from Ukraine spoke next. She said serenely that all nuclear weapons would be gone from Ukrainian territory by the end of the current year. The quadripartite U.S.-Russian-Kazakh-Belarusian declaration to be signed as the capstone to parallel negotiations to this conference would underline that commitment.

The tone changed when the delegate from Kazakhstan got the mike. He shouted directly at the chairman, in a threatening snarl. Dan watched faces alter as the translation filtered through the earphones.

Kazakhstan had acquiesced in the Lisbon Protocol to relinquish all strategic weapons over a seven-year period. It had also agreed, in principle, to the removal of hundreds of tactical nuclear weapons on its territory. The Kazakh government had implemented robust security. Rumors of unguarded weapons were false. However, aid promised by Russia, the United States, and others had never come. Extensive areas of radiological contamination from tests and accidents remained, especially around Semipalatinsk. Thousands of citizens suffered from radiation-induced cancers. The materials in the warheads were valuable property. Nor had Russia honored promises to allow Kazakhs to ensure that evacuated weapons were really being destroyed. As had also been pointed out by his friend from Belarus.

Therefore, President Nazarbayev had decided not to authorize the removal of the remaining R36M missiles from Kazakhstan. The country did not intend to use the weapons, but had to keep in mind its own security in an unstable region. Kazakhstan needed assistance and compensation, and a public apology for Russian actions there as well. Until these conditions were met, the missiles would stay. He spared a glare for Dan and the Chinese panelist too.

Flipping through his references, Dan saw that the R36M was known in the West as the SS-18.

With that knowledge came dread. A huge fourth-generation ICBM with ten one-megaton warheads, the R36M was bigger than the U.S. Peacekeeper and housed in deep, hardened silos. The M2 was a late-eighties variant, which meant they’d be both accurate and in decent shape.

Kazakhstan had been left with 104 of them at the breakup. If it kept them, a poor, Islamic, and increasingly corrupt and authoritarian country would wield a massive and invulnerable nuclear arsenal for many years to come.

He didn’t think this was a good idea, and judging by the silence after the Kazakh’s speech, no one else did either. The chairman looked furious but wasn’t saying a word. Looking along the table, Dan didn’t see anyone else reaching for the mike.

Reluctantly, he pulled it toward him, reminding himself to speak calmly and to accuse no one of anything. To feel his way forward, the way he’d seen the State people doing in the other panels. They usually started off by rephrasing what somebody they disagreed with had said, in the passive voice.

“The, uh … distinguished delegate from the Republic of Kazakhstan has advanced several reasons for abrogating his country’s obligations under the Lisbon Protocol, which was signed by President Nazarbayev signed”—he glanced at his notes—“three years ago. If I can summarize. They are, that assurances of foreign help in cleaning up contamination and to bring medical assistance to those ill as a result of testing activities have not been followed through on; that turning the weapons over would be divesting Kazakhstan of valuable resources; that they were not confident that weapons turned over were actually being destroyed; and finally, that retaining the weapons would enhance the republic’s security.”

“And an apology,” murmured the Brit.

“And an apology from the Russian Federation, successor state to the Soviet Union.”

The Kazakh nodded briefly, arms folded.

“With the chairman’s permission?” Dan glanced at the Russian general, who was sitting with arms folded too. No apologies from that quarter.

He cleared his throat, wishing they had water to sip, to stall with, while he figured out what the hell he was doing. “Uh, addressing those issues one by one. First. Far from ameliorating the situation left behind by previous regimes, maintaining a nuclear force will soak up funds needed for those very tasks of decontamination and health care. Far from being valuable resources, though the fissionable materials may have a certain economic value, these advanced missiles and associated systems will probably prove a liability, not an asset, over the long run, because of maintenance costs.

“Holding back weapons is not the way to assure yourself that those taken out of service will be destroyed. Working with the UN and other concerned agencies may be a better way to move toward that goal.

“Finally, the idea that nuclear weapons bring ‘stability’ in some form may be a misapprehension. Certainly both Russia and the U.S. can testify to that outcome. Twenty thousand — plus warheads on either side didn’t seem to bring any more stability, or security, than when there were a hundred. Or maybe, none.”