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Примечания

1

За исключением, может быть, работы Дэвида Финча “IMF: The Record and the Prospect» (by C. David Finch, Princeton University International Economics), вышедшей в сентябре 1989 г. Финч руководил в МВФ ключевым департаментом валютных и торговых отношений и в 1988 г. ушел в отставку, предположительно, из-за разногласий по поводу практически открытого политического давления в пользу оказания чрезвычайной финансовой помощи Египту и Польше в 1988 г.

2

Думаю, очевидно, что действующие сотрудники МВФ не станут, да и не должны излагать свое личное мнение о странах – членах фонда, с которыми они работают. Однако политика МВФ в области его внешних связей и сильное чувство цеховой солидарности внутри самого Фонда – это уже несколько иной предмет.

3