History of England 1-6

Chamberlain wanted to deal with continental matters quickly, so that he could concentrate on more important domestic and imperial issues. Like his father and his mentor Baldwin, he saw his country within the global context of an empire of ‘white dominions’ rather than as a European power. Unlike Baldwin, however, Chamberlain had a hubristic belief in his capacity to settle all difficulties and disputes through personal negotiation. One consequence of this attitude was that he adopted a far more active approach to European diplomacy; another was that he ignored the Foreign Office and Churchill when they warned him about Hitler’s untrustworthiness and territorial ambitions. Chamberlain preferred to rely instead on his own judgement and on the advice of an inner circle – all of them members of the so-called ‘old gang’ of experienced but unimaginative politicians. Churchill was disturbed by the ‘marked dearth of men of ability’ surrounding Chamberlain. Perhaps only an ageing, insular empire, and an archaic political system, could have produced such leaders. ‘These men’, Mussolini remarked, ‘are the tired sons of a long line of rich forefathers and they will lose their empire.’

As Lloyd George had once said, ‘Neville has a retail mind in a wholesale business’, and it was this meticulous ‘retail mind’ that now attempted to deal with the gangster and gambler in charge of Germany. Chamberlain’s strategy was the apparently reasonable and in some respects well-intentioned policy of appeasement, first invoked by Eden after Hitler’s remilitarization of the Rhineland. Appeasement involved addressing Hitler’s grievances regarding the ‘flawed’ Versailles Treaty, and permitting the extension of Germany’s influence in Eastern Europe. Germany might be permitted to absorb the German populations who lived in Czechoslovakia, Poland and Austria, all of whom ‘merited’ self-determination. If any of these developments sparked a regrettable war, it need not involve Britain. In terms of military policy, Britain would continue to rearm, while its diplomatic strategy would be to court Mussolini, in a bid to weaken the Rome–Berlin axis.

Chamberlain and his inner circle believed that the restoration of Germany’s power and status would satisfy Hitler and encourage him to ‘settle down’. Appeasement would be promoted through direct negotiation with the German dictator; conferences were suitable in some circumstances, but there was nothing better than face-to-face discussion for resolving difficult issues. In November 1937, Chamberlain sent his trusted cabinet colleague Viscount Halifax to inform Hitler that Britain was sympathetic to German territorial claims to Austria, Danzig and Czechoslovakia. At the same time the prime minister opened up a private line of communication with Mussolini: ‘an hour or two tête-à-tête with Musso,’ he mused, ‘might be extraordinarily valuable’.

The motivations of the appeasers, and the relative merits of their policy, have been endlessly debated. Appeasement was above all else inspired by the desire to avoid another bloody and costly conflict, and the English press amplified the message. In the late Thirties, the appalling consequences of a second world conflict were endlessly discussed, with visions of the coming apocalypse vividly depicted by the wireless and the newspapers. England’s cities would be reduced to rubble; its future generations would live amidst ruins. Since the English population was overwhelmingly anti-war, appeasement was an eloquent expression of its mood.

Yet appeasement also revealed a reluctance on Britain’s part to attend to its European responsibilities, as well as an unwillingness to condemn the Nazis, either on ideological or moral grounds. Continental issues often appeared as a distraction to Britain. With its colonies and dominions averse to participating in another conflict, the country sought continental peace at any cost. Hitler’s persecution of the Jews, as well as his assassination of political opponents, had become common knowledge, yet reports of Nazi brutality did not concern the men who formulated Britain’s foreign policy. Some Conservatives admired the way Hitler had ‘restored’ his country’s economy, while the English upper classes flocked to the extravagant parties laid on at the German embassy. George VI spoke for the ruling class when he described Nazi Germany as preferable to the ‘Bolshevik’ alternative.