History of England 1-6

Some historians see appeasement as part of Chamberlain’s subtle plan to play for time and to address the deficiencies in Britain’s defences. Rearmament was intensified between 1937 and 1939, while all departments of government were prepared for another war. Yet Chamberlain’s rearmament effort was too little and too late. The £1,500 million he earmarked for defence expenditure in 1937 fell short of the £1,884 million the various defence departments saw as essential. In any case, Chamberlain had supervised the economy since 1931 and could have spent more on defence before 1937.

Other historians follow Churchill in regarding appeasement as both hapless and hopeless. Chamberlain and his colleagues, the argument runs, turned out to be the victims of Hitler’s hypocrisy and mendacity, and vainly clung on to the hope of peace because they could not face the prospect of another war. The government should have embarked on a more extensive rearmament programme, while Chamberlain ought to have constructed a grand anti-fascist alliance with France and Russia. With powerful allies and weapons behind him, the prime minister might have called Hitler’s bluff. In the end, it is hard not to see the period 1937 to 1939 as a series of wasted opportunities and, in Churchill’s memorable phrase, as a ‘line of milestones to the disaster’.

Between 1937 and 1938, Britain tried to persuade Mussolini to withdraw his troops from Spain and to recognize the Mediterranean status quo, in return for an acknowledgement of his Abyssinian conquest; the Duce was not tempted. Neither would he help Chamberlain with his attempts to persuade Hitler to resolve the ‘Austrian question’ through negotiation. In March 1938, without warning the other European powers, Hitler sent troops into Austria to incorporate the country into a Greater Germany. There was no opposition from the Austrian army or government.

Chamberlain was not averse to Germany absorbing Austria, despite the fact that the country was a democratic republic and a member of the League. But he was ‘deeply shocked’ by Hitler’s unilateral show of force and sent an official protest to Berlin. When German diplomats told him that Austria was none of Britain’s business, Chamberlain became angry. But what was he going to do about it? This was the question Churchill asked in the Commons, warning that Europe was ‘confronted with a programme of aggression, nicely calculated and timed, unfolding stage by stage’.

It is doubtful that Hitler ever engaged in precision planning, yet Churchill’s argument was soon justified by events. After Austria, Hitler turned his attention to Czechoslovakia, where a majority of Germans lived in the northwest area known as the Sudetenland. He declared that he would ‘defend’ the ‘liberties’ of these Germans and ensure their right to join a Greater Germany. His intention was to incorporate the Sudetenland, perhaps as a prelude to the annexation of other parts of Czechoslovakia.

Following Hitler’s absorption of Austria, Chamberlain had been asked in the Commons to pledge support for Czechoslovakia’s independence. Created by the Versailles Treaty, the country had been exceptional among the new Eastern European states in maintaining its democratic institutions since 1919. Rich in industrial and military resources and occupying an important geopolitical position, its borders had already been guaranteed by France and Russia. Yet Chamberlain declined to follow – ensuring the Czech frontiers would be militarily impossible and diplomatically risky, carrying with it the possibility of provoking another European war. Army chiefs, meanwhile, had warned the prime minister that British intervention would be like ‘a man attacking a tiger before his gun is loaded’. Chamberlain believed that neither the public, nor the armies of the empire, would ‘follow us … into war to prevent a minority from obtaining autonomy; it must be on larger issues than that’.

The Russians, eager to halt any possible German territorial advance in the east, proposed a conference whose aim would be to stop continental aggression. The Labour party and Churchill saw this as an opportunity to establish an alliance that would deter Hitler and encourage opposition to him within Germany. Yet Chamberlain declined to participate – he loathed Communism and thought the Soviets wanted to embroil Britain in a war with Germany. He informed the ‘idealistic cranks’ and ‘warmongers’ in the Commons who criticized his decision that conferences were, any case, ineffective. It was far better to take the direct, personal route.