Over the spring of 1939 there was a sea change in English opinion. The papers now advocated standing up to Hitler, even if this made war probable. ‘Who can hope to appease a boa constrictor?’ asked one journalist. At long last, the threat of Fascism was widely recognized. ‘We’ll have to stop him next time,’ people commented in pubs across the country. ‘We’ll have to cry Halt. We’ll have to go to war.’
Even Chamberlain now changed his tune. In a public speech made after Germany’s annexation of Czechia, he asked: ‘Is this the last attack upon a small State, or is it to be followed by another?’ Even the prime minister could see that appeasement had failed. He also warned Hitler that Britain would ‘take part to the uttermost of its power in resisting’ any attempt to ‘dominate the world by force’. The prime minister backed up his words with action, by announcing the conscription of 200,000 men for six months’ military training.
Chamberlain also made a momentous diplomatic commitment when reports of German troops’ movements on Poland’s border prompted the prime minister to pledge Britain’s support for Polish independence, a promise that was seconded by the French. It was an uncharacteristically bold gesture from Chamberlain, and unprecedented from a British prime minister in peacetime. It was also extremely rash, since there was no access to Poland for either British or French troops. Moreover, with only France supporting Britain, the country was in a much weaker position than she had been a year previously when Czechoslovakia and Russia would also have stood up to Hitler. ‘I cannot understand,’ the seventy-six-year-old Lloyd George complained in parliament, ‘why before committing ourselves we did not secure the adhesion of Russia … If we are going in without the help of Russia we are walking into a trap.’ Churchill and Labour agreed, and once more demanded a ‘Grand Alliance against aggression’ including Russia. Yet Chamberlain did not rate Russia highly as a military power and had a profound loathing of communists: ‘I distrust Russia’s motives,’ he said, ‘which seem to me to have little connection with our ideas of Liberty.’ The contrast with his attitude towards Hitler and Mussolini could not have been more marked.
Nevertheless, discussions did take place between Britain and Soviet Russia in the first six months of 1939. The British wanted a pledge of military assistance from the Russians, should that be desired by both Britain and Poland; the Russians, meanwhile, sought a more general and mutual guarantee against German aggression. The talks did nothing to diminish suspicion on either side, and were conducted half-heartedly by Chamberlain’s government, who may have seen them as a means of prompting Hitler to return to the negotiating table. Once there, Chamberlain was prepared to offer the German chancellor the control of Danzig, and economic influence in Africa and in the east of Europe – exactly what the Russians most feared.
Once again, Chamberlain’s hopes were not realized. Instead of opening fresh discussions with Britain, Germany embarked on its own talks with Russia, which would pave the way for the Nazi– Soviet Pact of August 1939. Russia agreed to remain neutral should Germany become embroiled in a war, and Germany agreed to limit its territorial ambitions in Poland. Germany was no longer ‘encircled’, and Russia was no longer isolated. News of the pact was greeted with consternation in Britain. Conservative MPs, who had seen Nazi Germany as an infinitely lesser evil than Soviet Russia, felt betrayed by Hitler, while the Left felt betrayed by Stalin.
Chamberlain spoke publicly of his determination to honour Britain’s agreement with Poland, while privately trying to lure Hitler away from Poland with the promise of economic rewards. Pressure was also placed on Poland to accede to German demands over Danzig, but the Poles stood firm. Hitler, unconvinced that Britain and France would go to war over Poland, thought he could once more deceive the enemy with a successful yet limited war in Poland, followed by negotiations in which Britain and France would cede to his demands.