Хмурые будни холодной войны. Ее солдаты, прорабы и невольные участники

The view of history which perpetuated the Cold War was one of apprehension on an unfolding “space age” horizon – as opposed to retrospective fear and conventional military stalemate. The view was futuristic, perhaps reckless. Both Krushchev and Kennedy pursued a policy of brinkmanship with the genuine prospect of nuclear calamity at a time when control systems for these weapons were still unsophisticated. The “arms race” characterising this policy was essentially illogical in that any nuclear strike was likely to escalate to broad based destruction and an arsenal of hundreds of ICBM’s exceeded any tactical requirement. Soviet management of this unstable situation became increasingly introverted as Krushchev was succeeded by internal contention for authority, initially by the “Troika”, then through the short terms of Andropov and Chernenko. Attempts by Breshnev and Carter to promote the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks foundered. The strategic situation was unchanged: both superpowers were breathless in pursuit of nuclear supremacy whilst a chasm developed in global economies: the wealth of the West compared to command economies in the East challenged the historical socialist view that capitalism would inevitably fail. Eastern Bloc States, witnessing this relative deprivation, sought greater autonomy. Breshnev advised the Politburo: “…It is… apparent that we are experiencing a very complicated period in the development of international relations. A serious deterioration and exacerbation of the situation has occurred. And the primary source of this deterioration is the growing aggression of the foreign policy of the Carter government

¹⁰ As George Kennan advised Truman, Ronald Reagan might have been cautioned that the Soviet Bloc was expansionist and a natural response was “containment”, there being two variables in its modern form. The first was the Warsaw Pact crumbling through over extension and lack of investment. Secondly, a technology was needed to confound nuclear devastation. Reagan’s response was the Strategic Defence Initiative – derided as “Star Wars” – sustaining the view of history which perpetuated the Cold War: an unwavering belief in scientific advancement and yet a readiness to pull the trigger.

The Soviet historiography, also extending the Cold War, shared the sense of stalemate. This perspective, beginning with proletarian revolution, readily expressed the Cold War as a class struggle. Gorbachev, considering nuclear attack less likely, possibly believing the potential of SDI or perceiving its naive foundation, was able to transcend Soviet orthodoxy creating a radical comprehension of past systemic failure. Added to this reassessment of the Soviet world view was the fragmentation experienced in the Eastern Bloc with previously passive satellites like Poland contentiously espousing liberalism. Whereas the United States held to an unyielding perception of Soviet totalitarianism, parts of the Soviet regime understood that change was inevitable.

Gorbachev’s reforms, highlighted by glasnost and perestroika, refuted the command economy and regarded totalitarianism as an unworkable ethic. As the Berlin Airlift and the Cuban Missile Crisis represented tipping points in Cold War historiography, the fall of the Berlin Wall, where Gorbachev played a keystone role, marked its demise.

Whether late eighties summits resulted in a meaningful exchange between the folksy Reagan and the emollient Gorbachev is problematic although they did result in the abolition of an entire class of nuclear weapons. The view of history which perpetuated the Cold War, driven by equally culpable states harnessed to a technology fuelled race for supremacy, was being re-defined. A new openness was manifest. At the Brandenberg Gate, Reagan called out to Gorbachev to “Tear down this wall!” Drama has a role to play in international relations and perhaps Gorbachev responded to Reagan’s theatrics by refusing East German requests for Soviet tanks in Liepzig to suppress protestors using the Nikolai Church as the focal point for liberalisation demands. These events, together with Hungary opening its borders, precipitated the collapse of the Berlin Wall by popular action.