Хмурые будни холодной войны. Ее солдаты, прорабы и невольные участники

³⁶ РГАЭ. Ф. 8044. On. 1. Д. 2808. Л. 3.

³⁷Данилов А.А., Пыжиков А.В. Рождение сверхдержавы: СССР в первые послевоенные годы. М., 2001. С. 92.

‘The Cold War was brought about by views of history, was perpetuated by views of history, and only ended when one superpower transcended its view of history.’

Richardson Ian

October 2009

The opening decades of the twentieth century witnessed two world wars, dislocation of the political ancien regime and an erosion of colonialism. A view of history evolved which averred that conflict invariably leads to massive loss of life and social revolution. New imperial powers emerged: the USSR propounding a regime of command economics and limited sovereignty of Eastern Bloc satellite States, countermanded by the reluctant empire of the United States – recently awoken from a protectionist dream and having as its underpinning unbridled capitalism and the dispersal of corporatism beyond domestic markets. De Toqueville had presciently foreseen the emergence of these two hegemonies a century before “called by some secret design of Providence

^9,1 anticipating the fatalistic attitudes of post war Europe. The Berlin Crisis provided the crucible for the first phase of the Cold War drama – as much a Zeitgeist as a clash of political philosophies.

Truman’s policies were innovative yet combative. His use of nuclear weapons against Japan transformed military theory, extinguished imperial power and provided tools for confrontational geopolitics in addition to, however, sponsoring the United Nations. Partly out of a need to demonstrate convincing change in the United States to stimulate an economy transitioning from war to peace, Truman dramatised his world view. In his first address to Congress, Truman offered contrasting visions: the first was of “the conspiracy of the Axis powers to dominate the world”,

the other a conviction that “America may well lead the world to peace and prosperity.” ² Framed by continuing belligerence with Japan, this set the moral polemic for subsequent nuclear attacks. Stalin, celebrating the defeat of Germany, noted: “The period of war in Europe has closed. A period of peaceful development has been ushered in.”³ What had not yet materialised was conflicting encounter between the USA and the USSR. Truman and Stalin’s rhetoric targeted a defeated enemy. The “Axis” was overthrown but provided a durable metaphor serving national ambition. The combative nature of both men became increasingly acerbic. Truman’s inaugural address to the U.N. restated his world view: “We still have a choice between the alternatives: the continuation of international chaos – or the establishment of a world organisation for the enforcement of peace.” ⁴

The USSR and the United States dominated a nascent geopolitical order with the United Kingdom and France denuded by decades of attrition. Key features of this regime would underpin the Cold War. The bellicose ire of Stalin and Truman’s statesmanship found a flashpoint in Berlin. Reconstruction and the emergence of new political parties in Germany provided a volatility wherein competing ideologies could collide. Arguably, the Marshall Plan laid the basis for an attenuated Cold War, rather than a temporary crisis. The U.S. stressed the need for a competitive German industrial base. Molotov, representing the USSR, walked out of the Marshall negotiations. Reportedly, Stalin believed that a weakened Germany posed less of a risk to the new buffer zone of Eastern Bloc States.⁵ A seminal event took place during the March 1948 meeting of the Allied Control Council: Sokolovsky declared the meeting adjourned after failing to receive a briefing on a prior London conference. Truman noted: “For most of Germany; this act merely formalised what had been an obvious fact for some time…For the city of Berlin, however, this was the curtain raiser for a major crisis.”⁶ The walk out precipitated the Soviet blockade of the Allied sectors necessitating the airlift.