The Day We Lost the H-Bomb: Cold War, Hot Nukes, and the Worst Nuclear Weapons Disaster in History

17 Eisenhower's philosophy led to a windfall: Statistics in this paragraph come from Worden, Rise of the Fighter Generals, p. 67, and Lloyd, Cold War Legacy, pp. 676, 677, 681.

17 “SAC was still the big daddy”: Jerome Martin interview, August 26, 2005.

18 SAC hosted a classified briefing: Moore's memo is in David Alan Rosenberg, “A Smoking Radiating Ruin at the End of Two Hours': Documents on American Plans for Nuclear War with the Soviet Union, 1954–1955,” International Security 6, no. 3 (Winter 1981–82), pp. 25–28. The Sunday Punch is described in Fred Kaplan, The Wizards of Armageddon (New York: Simon

&Schuster, 1983), p. 204, and Worden, Rise of the Fighter Generals, p. 108.

18. The concept of alert time: Kaplan, Wizards of Armageddon, pp. 97–110.

19 LeMay had flown to Washington: Information on the 1956 “bomber gap” hearings comes from Kaplan, Wizards of Armageddon, pp. 156–160; Worden, Rise of the Fighter Generals, pp. 78–79; and The New York Times' coverage of the hearings.

19 Worrisome intelligence had trickled in: Information on the 1955 Soviet airshow comes from Kaplan, Wizards of Armageddon, p. 156; Worden, Rise of the Fighter Generals

, p. 78; and “Bison vs. B-52,” The New York Times, May 6, 1956, The Week in Review, p. 1.

20 The Soviets had only ten Bisons: Pavel Podvig, ed., Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2004), p. 375.

20 The budget already included $16.9 billion: “On Arms and Aid,” The New York Times, Week in Review, May 13, 1956, p. 1.

21 “Curt LeMay thinks only of SAC”: “Defense under Fire,” Time, May 14, 1956.

21 To counter the threat: Henry M. Narducci,

Strategic Air Command and the Alert Program: A Brief History (Offutt Air Force Base, Neb.: Office of the Historian, Headquarters Strategic Air Command, 1988), pp. 1–4; Lloyd, Cold War Legacy, pp. 244–245; J. C. Hopkins and Sheldon A.

Goldberg, The Development of the Strategic Air Command, 1946–1986 (Offutt Air Force Base, Neb.: Office of the Historian, Headquarters Strategic Air Command, 1986), p. 65. An earlier alert operation occurred in February 1955, but the first true proof-of-concept test for ground alert was Operation TRY OUT, from November 1956 to March 1957. A description of life on ground alert can be found in “On Continuous Alert,” The New York Times Magazine, December 8, 1957, pp. 10–11.

21 the Soviets launchedSputnik: Paul Dickson, Sputnik: The Shock of the Century (New York: Berkley Books, 2001). The Johnson quote appears on p. 117. See also Kaplan, Wizards of Armageddon, pp. 135–136. An example of press reaction to ground alert in the wake of Sputnik

is Richard Witkin, “S.A.C. Operating New Alert Program: Aims to Get Third of Bomber Force Airborne within 15 Minutes after Attack,” The New York Times, November 11, 1957, p. 12.

22 SAC began testing another program: Hopkins and Goldberg, Development of the Strategic Air Command, 1946–1986, p. 74.

22 “Any Soviet surprise attack”: Hanson W. Baldwin, “Ready or Not? President Upheld on Plan Not to Keep Bombers Constantly in Air on Alert,” The New York Times, March 8, 1959.

22 Airborne alert was ready to go: John D. Morris, “Soviet ICBM Held Able to Pinpoint 5,000-Mile Target,” The New York Times, January 31, 1959, p. 1; Power, quoted in Hopkins and Goldberg, Development of the Strategic Air Command, p. 83.

22 “futile and disastrous”: Jack Raymond, “President Sees Dangers in Full Mobilization Now,” The New York Times, March 5, 1959, p. 1.