Yagoda’s position at that time remains something of a mystery. It is clear that he was involved in the preparations for the 1936 Trial from the start—though perhaps excluded from the key discussions and conversations preceding the case. He is indeed said to have “urged that the case be discussed in the Politburo.”16
At the same time, it seems that he was himself deceived by Stalin’s assurance that Zinoviev and Kamenev would not be executed.17 He was later to be accused of shielding I. N. Smirnov—though there was an obvious motive here, in that this was advanced as an explanation for Smirnov’s unsatisfactory behavior in the dock.18 Nevertheless, it does seem that Yagoda may have made some attempt to temper the wind to the oppositionists.19 He was to be similarly accused of ordering that Uglanov’s testimony be kept “within certain limits.”20 And there are other reports of underground obstruction within the NKVD which took the form of framing questions in such a way as to protect those interrogated.21 The most likely occasion for the development of more definite resistance on Yagoda’s part would beWe can be sure that Yezhov (who was to replace Yagoda) offered stronger resistance to clearing the Rightists. He seems to have acquiesced very reluctantly in the decision. He regarded the rehabilitation of Bukharin and Rykov as temporary, “vowing that he would yet make good the ‘mistake,’”22
and he and Agranov almost immediately started accusing Yagoda of laxness.For the moment, Bukharin and Rykov were safe. The former continued to hold his position as editor of
On 25 September, Stalin and Zhdanov sent a telegram from Sochi to Kaganovich, Molotov, “and other members of the Political Bureau”:
We deem it absolutely necessary and urgent that Comrade Yezhov be nominated to the post of People’s Commissar for Internal Affairs. Yagoda had definitely proved himself to be incapable of unmasking the Trotskyite–Zinovievite bloc. The OGPU is four years behind in this matter. This is noted by all Party workers and by the majority of the representatives of the NKVD.23
The “four years” is significant and sinister. It was four years almost to the day since the September session of 1932 which had blocked the attempt to execute Ryutin. It has since been suggested that the phrase might refer to the four years passed after meetings and connections between Trotsky’s son and Soviet sympathizers, and the alleged formation of the Trotskyite–Zinovievite bloc, in 1932. But the chief offender, I. N. Smirnov, had been arrested within weeks, and since 1934 the NKVD had been finishing off Trotskyites and Zinovievites by the score, so could hardly have been said to have fallen behind four years. The point is hardly a crucial one. But in fact it was now that Ryutin was brought back to the Lubyanka from an isolator and his interrogation began. On 4 November, he was signing a “categorical refusal” to confess to terrorism.24
It seems certain that Stalin proposed to use him in the next show trial, but despite “illegal methods” he remained recalcitrant.No one, of course, thought for a moment that Yagoda’s removal indicated mere “incapability.” It was at once noted in the Party that “it was not a question of dissatisfaction with his insufficiently active work … this indicated political distrust of him.”25
The transfer of Yezhov to duties that he was already much concerned with in any case could hardly have been the occasion for members of the Politburo to oppose the General Secretary, even if Ordzhonikidze, Chubar, or Kossior might have wished this. Although the tone and the intention of the new appointment would be obvious, as a practical measure it would be hard to argue against.
The following day, Molotov carried out instructions. The shift was used to rid the Soviet Government of Rykov. Next day, the papers announced Rykov’s “release,” without the conventional comment that he was going to “other work”; the appointment of Yagoda to Rykov’s post of People’s Commissar of Communications; and Yezhov’s appointment as Head of the NKVD.