The Great Terror

In March and April 1935 came a secret trial of the “Moscow Counter-Revolutionary Organization—‘Workers’ Opposition’ Group.” A. G. Shlyapnikov, Lenin’s chief representative in Russia during the First World War, had headed the intra-Party Workers’ Opposition, which had opposed the bureaucracy until Lenin banned such groupings in 1921. He spent his later years sometimes free, sometimes in jail, sometimes in exile in the Arctic, or working on the Lower Volga Shipping Line. Like Smilga, he was rearrested on 1 January 1935. Shlyapnikov, his chief henchman S. P. Medvedev, and thirteen others were now sentenced by the Special Board to various terms of imprisonment, though worse faced them later.¹⁴ Shlyapnikov’s wife was sent to labor camp.¹⁵

The same piecemeal progress was being made, during this outwardly quiet period, in thought control and in the Party purge. A circular of 7 March 1935 ordered the removal from libraries of all the works of Trotsky, Zinoviev, and Kamenev. Another, dated 21 June, extended the list to include Preobrazhensky and others.¹⁶

A secret letter dated 19 May 1935 from the Central Committee called for the special investigation of “enemies of the Party and the working class” who had remained within the Party. On 27 June, a special (and evidently typical) Central Committee resolution on the Western province censured the local officials in charge of the Party purge for insufficient vigilance.

In the Smolensk rayon, 455 out of 4,100 members examined were expelled, after 700 oral and 200 written denunciations.¹⁷

One member was denounced for having admitted that he had in his possession “a platform of the Trotskyites.” A professor had given a favorable character reference to a Trotskyite and now “never expressed his attitude toward the Trotskyite counter-revolution.” A group of worker members of the Party wrote denouncing their local leadership for refusing to listen to denunciations. Typical of remarks at Party meetings were such attacks as “There is information that Smolov is married to the daughter of the merchant Kovalev, and that the Party organizer of the second group of the Institute is the son of a person who was given a strict reprimand.”¹⁸ By 1 August, as a report signed by Yezhov and Malenkov noted, 23 percent of the Party cards in this representative area had been withdrawn or held pending investigation.¹⁹

Even more striking were some of the changes in Soviet law. A decree of 30 March made the illegal carrying of a knife punishable by five years’ imprisonment. A decree of 9 June, later incorporated into the Criminal Code (Article 58 [i.a, i.b, ix]), was a much more startling departure, exemplifying in full the style of the Stalin epoch. It provided the death penalty for flight abroad by both civil and military; in the case of the military, members of the family aware of the intended offense were subject to up to ten years’ imprisonment, while (the real novelty) those who knew nothing whatever about it—“the remaining adult members of the traitor’s family, and those living with him or dependent on him at the time”—were made liable to a five-year exile.

A Soviet law book, justifying this, speaks approvingly of

the application of special measures in respect of the adult members of the family of a serviceman-traitor in the event of the latter’s flight or escape across the frontier in those cases where the adult member of the family in no way contributed to the act of treachery that was being prepared or executed and did not even know of it…. The political significance of it consists in the strengthening of the overall preventive action of the criminal law for the purpose of averting so heinous a felony as the action of a serviceman in crossing or flying across the frontier, as the result of which the guilty party cannot himself be subjected to punishment.²⁰

In fact, we have a crude and frank institution of the hostage system—a sign of the way Stalin was thinking in other cases as well.fn1

More extraordinary still, and just as relevant to Stalin’s general plans, was the decree of 7 April 1935 extending all penalties, including death, down to twelveyear-old children.²¹

This decree was noted in the West, where it made very bad anti-Soviet propaganda. Many people wondered why Stalin had made such a law public. Even if he meant to shoot children, this could be done without publicity. Indeed, an NKVD veteran tells how the bezprizorniye—homeless orphans of the wars and famines—had been reduced by indiscriminate shooting two or three years earlier.²²

Stalin’s motives, as it turned out, were centered elsewhere. He could now threaten oppositionists quite “legally” with the death of their children as accomplices if they did not carry out his wishes. The mere fact of his accepting the disadvantages of publicizing the law gave it a sinister seriousness.