We have already seen, and will see further, that the Russian aristocracy grew hand in hand with the Russian state, that the peasant commune was much older than the state, and that the Orthodox church was stronger than the state (at least in the time of Ivan III, i.e., centuries before Peter I and Alexander II). Thus, the artificial creation of Russian civil society by the state seems more than questionable. Speaking in the crude terms of the stereotype, it would seem that the state rather
But to say only this is still to say very little. The real question is how the state achieved these spectacular results. And here, instead of dolefully masticating obsolete wisdom, we are compelled to note the fateful role of the Russian right of the sixteenth century, the Josephites. They were the ones who succeeded in halting reform. They provided the messianic theory of the Third Rome. They supplied all the ideological ammunition for the autocratic dream of Ivan the Terrible, thus initiating the process leading to his "revolution from above." This is, moreover, what their spiritual descendants have been doing ever since. For centuries the Russian right has been virtually collaborating in the destruction of civil society. This has been the ultimate result of its ideas, its intolerance and hatred, its insistence on the extermination of its opponents. The Josephites deserved their punishment. What was unfair was that along with them the entire nation had to go to its Golgotha.
But if this is where the Pyrrhic victories of the Russian right have invariably brought the nation, should it not be one of the basic lessons which the Russian establishment—again and again faced with the same choice between West and East, between reform and stagnation—needs to learn from the historians? Is it not here that their part in the historical drama begins—especially inasmuch as the spiritual descendants and intellectual heirs of the Josephites are once again trying to push the nation in the same direction?44
44. See, in this respect, Alexander Yanov,
CHAPTER VI
THE END OF RUSSIAN ABSOLUTISM
The age of Russian absolutism was short, its end tragic. But did it in fact disappear without a trace? Was it simply an accidental episode in Russian history—a liberal intermezzo in the autocratic symphony, a vague dream, dissipated forever?
Let us assume that the Great Reform of the 1550s—the legislative introduction of local self-government on a national scale, accompanied by trial by jury and income tax—was not rescinded "in the stormy years of Ivan the Terrible's long wars ... by the