The Russian Revolution

In the memoirs he wrote after retiring from public life, Witte claimed that while he had indeed supported a vigorous Russian policy in the Far East, he had in mind exclusively economic penetration, and that his plans were wrecked by irresponsible generals and politicians. This thesis, however, cannot be sustained in the light of the archival evidence that has surfaced since. Witte’s plans for economic penetration of the Far East were conceived in the spirit of imperialism of the age: it called for a strong military presence, which was certain sooner or later to violate China’s sovereignty and come in conflict with the imperial ambitions of Japan. This became apparent in 1895, when Witte had the idea of shortening the route of the Trans-Siberian Railroad by cutting across Chinese Manchuria. He obtained China’s consent with bribes given the Chinese statesman Li Hung-chang and the promise of a defensive alliance. An agreement to this effect was signed in June 1896 during Li Hungchang’s visit to Moscow to attend the coronation of Nicholas II. The signatories pledged mutual help in the event of an attack on either of them or on Korea. China allowed Russia to construct a line to Vladivostok across Manchuria, on the understanding that her sovereignty in that province would be respected.

Russia immediately violated the terms of the treaty by introducing numerous police and military units into Manchuria and establishing in Kharbin a quasi-independent base of operations. More Russian troops were sent to Manchuria during the anti-Western Boxer Rebellion (1900). In 1898 Russia extracted from China the naval base at Port Arthur on a long-term lease.

With these steps, and despite Nicholas’s desire for peaceful relations and the reservations of some ministers, Russia headed for a confrontation with Japan. In November 1902, high-ranking Russian officials held a secret conference in Yalta to discuss China’s complaints about Russia’s treaty violations and the problems caused by the reluctance of foreigners to invest in Russia’s Far Eastern ventures. It was agreed that Russia could attain her economic objectives in Manchuria only by intense colonization; but for Russians to settle there, the regime needed to tighten its hold on the area. It was the unanimous opinion of the participants, Witte included, that Russia had to annex Manchuria, or, at the very least, bring it under closer control.²⁴

In the months that followed, the Minister of War, A. N. Kuropatkin, urged aggressive action to protect the Trans-Siberian Railroad: in his view, unless Russia was prepared to annex Manchuria she should withdraw from there. In February 1903, Nicholas agreed to annexation.²⁵

The Japanese, who had their own ambitions in the region, tried to forestall a conflict by agreement on spheres of influence: they would recognize Russian interests in Manchuria in return for an acknowledgment of their interests in Korea. An accord might have been reached along these lines were it not that in August 1903 Nicholas dismissed Witte as Minister of Finance: after that, Russia’s Far Eastern diplomacy began to drift, with no one in charge. It is then that socially prominent speculators, interested in exploiting Korean lumber resources, aggravated relations with Japan.* Persuaded that Russia would not negotiate, the Japanese in late 1903 decided to go to war. Although aware of Japan’s preparations, the Russians did nothing, willing to let her bear the blame for initiating hostilities. They held the Japanese in utter contempt: Alexander III had called them “monkeys who play Europeans,” and the common people joked that they would smother the makaki (macaques) with their caps.

On February 8, 1904, without declaring war, Japan attacked and laid siege to the naval base at Port Arthur. Sinking some Russian warships and bottling up the rest, they secured command of the sea which permitted them to land troops on the Korean peninsula. The battles that followed were fought on Manchurian soil, along the Korean border, far away from the centers of her population and industry, which presented Russia with considerable logistic difficulties. These were compounded by the fact that the Trans-Siberian was not yet fully operational when the war broke out because of an unfinished stretch around Lake Baikal. In every engagement, Japan displayed superior quality of command as well as better intelligence.