The Great Terror

Perhaps it was this that led Stalin to insist on his inclusion in the “Center” in spite of the physical impossibility of his having participated in anything of the kind. For, as even Agranov is said to have tentatively objected, there would be some difficulty in making the charge plausible, since Smirnov had been held in jail throughout the period of the alleged plot. Stalin “gave Agranov a sullen look and said, ‘Don’t be afraid, that’s all.’”⁶⁴

Mrachkovsky had also fought in Siberia. He had run Trotsky’s underground printing press in 1927, and had been the first oppositionist to be arrested. He was regarded as simply a “fighter.” He had been in jail since 1933. Ter-Vaganyan, an intellectual Armenian described as both honest and unambitious, had fought with great distinction in the Revolution and Civil War, and afterward had reverted to ideology and journalism. He, too, had been in exile in Kazakhstan since 1933.

A fourth Trotskyite was thrown in for some good measure—Dreitzer, the former head of Trotsky’s bodyguard and prominent in the 1927 demonstrations. He was not accused of being a member of the “Center,” but rather as the head organizer of assassin groups.

The first examinations of the leading prisoners were a total failure. Smirnov had gone on hunger strike for thirteen days on 8 May, and on 20 May was still replying, “I deny that; again I deny; I deny.” Ter-Vaganyan also twice undertook hunger strikes and wrote to Stalin that he had decided on suicide.⁶⁵ Mrachkovsky’s key interrogation is said to have lasted ninety hours, without result, though Stalin rang up at intervals to inquire how things were going.⁶⁶

So far the case was entirely Trotskyite. Stalin now ordered the implication of the Zinovievites. Yagoda was later to be accused of rejecting the evidence against them, and Agranov (or so he was to say when attacking Yagoda and Molchanov in 1937) went behind his back to the Moscow Provincial NKVD. He and Yezhov composed the full plan of the “United”—that is Trotskyite and ZinovieviteCenter, and with A. P. Radzivilovsky and other leading figures in the Moscow NKVD he obtained the necessary confessions. Radzivilovsky wrote later that “extraordinarily difficult work for three weeks on Dreitzer and Pikel” was needed before they gave testimony. Although Yagoda at first rejected it, Agranov said that it was only thus that the investigation was put on the right track. Richard Pikel, formerly Zinoviev’s secretary, had already given evidence in the “Kremlin Affair.” A writer and playwright who had served in the Civil War, he became more cooperative when transferred to the central NKVD, where a number of the leading figures were old friends of his. They promised him his life, an offer later confirmed by Yagoda.⁶⁷

It was only in late June or early July that Zinoviev and his leading supporters were brought to Moscow from their isolators.⁶⁸

At first Zinoviev made “obdurate denials.”⁶⁹ Bakayev made “persistent denials.”⁷⁰ In general, all the genuine oppositionists refused to confess and pointed out that they had been in prison or exile in the remotest parts of the country during most of the period, and under close NKVD supervision during the rest of it. Molchanov then gave the interrogators to understand that earlier orders about not using unlawful means of interrogation were not to be taken too seriously.⁷¹

The interrogation of Zinoviev and Kamenev was put in charge of the most senior officials: Agranov, Molchanov, and Mironov. Zinoviev was ill at the time with a liver ailment, and the routine interrogation was postponed.⁷² He had once again written to the Politburo vaguely accepting “responsibility” for the assassination of Kirov. This was returned with an insistence on “greater sincerity.”⁷³

With Kamenev, the attempt was made to secure a confession by ordinary interrogative methods. Mironov conducted it. But Kamenev resisted him in spite of all his efforts, exposing Reingold at a “confrontation” and in general standing firm.

Mironov reported to Stalin that Kamenev was refusing to confess, and later gave an account of the conversation to a close acquaintance:

“You think that Kamenev may not confess?” asked Stalin, his eyes slyly screwed up.

“I don’t know,” Mironov answered. “He doesn’t yield to persuasion.”

“You don’t know?” inquired Stalin with marked surprise, staring at Mironov. “Do you know how much our state weighs, with all the factories, machines, the army, with all the armaments and the navy?”

Mironov and all those present looked at Stalin with surprise.

“Think it over and tell me,” demanded Stalin. Mironov smiled, believing that Stalin was getting ready to crack a joke. But Stalin did not intend to jest. He looked at Mironov quite in earnest. “I am asking you, how much does all that weigh?” he insisted.