The Great Terror

It now seemed suitable for Stalin to make a direct political approach to Zinoviev and Kamenev. Yezhov gave them what were represented as the Politburo’s instructions, to “disarm in a manner that will preclude any hope on your part of raising your head against the Party ever again.” The alternative was a trial by military court behind closed doors and the execution of the entire opposition, including the thousands in the camps.

Zinoviev refused, and a similar attempt on Kamenev was also unsuccessful, though Yezhov this time directly threatened that Kamenev’s son would be shot if he did not give in.

A tighter interrogative routine was then inflicted on them. Yagoda had the heat put on in the cells, though the weather was now hot. Zinoviev’s physical condition was very bad, and Kamenev was beginning to weaken under the threats to his son, whose arrest was finally ordered in his presence. In July, Zinoviev, after an all-night interrogation, asked to speak to Kamenev, and when they had discussed the matter they agreed to go on trial on condition that Stalin would confirm his promises to them, of executing neither themselves nor their followers, in the presence of the whole Politburo.

This was accepted. However, when they were taken to the alleged Politburo meeting, only Stalin, Voroshilov, and Yezhov were present. Stalin explained that they formed a “commission” of the Politburo authorized to hear the case.⁷⁸

This appeal to the Politburo and Stalin’s partial evasion of it present some interesting points. Both appeal and evasion suggest that there were still some men in the Politburo who might have been relied on to try to have its guarantees respected. In fact, it is curious that as late as the execution of Rudzutak in 1938, some attempt at a similar appeal is suggested when we are told that “he was not even called before the Central Committee Political Bureau because Stalin did not want to talk to him.”⁷⁹

Although shaken by the absence of the other Politburo members, the prisoners, after some argument, finally accepted Stalin’s terms, which guaranteed their lives, the lives of their supporters, and the liberty of their families. (A member of Zinoviev’s family told Krivitsky that one reason for capitulation was “to save his family,”⁸⁰

and in Kamenev’s case the same is obviously true—and can be seen in his final plea.)

With the surrender of Zinoviev and Kamenev, the game was in Stalin’s hands. The trial was on. The lesser political figures were expendable at a pinch, and in any case no stronger argument could be put to them than the willingness of their seniors to go along with the trial and accept Stalin’s promises.

Kamenev’s own confession was under way on 13 July (and presumably Zinoviev’s too). Bakayev was confessing by 17 July; Dreitser, by 23 July.⁸¹

Mrachkovsky was confessing by 20 July, and on 21 July he had a “confrontation” with Smirnov. There are two slightly different accounts of this.⁸² One of them, evidently based on the official record, has these old friends quarreling because of what Smirnov regarded as Mrachkovsky’s weakness in surrendering. The other shows them as still on good terms at the end. In any case, Mrachkovsky made some such remark as “Why, Ivan Nikitich, you want to get out of a sordid bloody business with a clean shirt?” And Smirnov’s firm comment was “invention and slander!”⁸³